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Abstract: 
On the basis of the executive-attention theory of working memory capacity (WMC; e.g., M. J. Kane, A. R. A. 
Conway, D. Z. Hambrick, & R. W. Engle, 2007), the authors tested the relations among WMC, mind 
wandering, and goal neglect in a sustained attention to response task (SART; a go/no-go task). In 3 SART 
versions, making conceptual versus perceptual processing demands, subjects periodically indicated their 
thought content when probed following rare no-go targets. SART processing demands did not affect mind-
wandering rates, but mind-wandering rates varied with WMC and predicted goal-neglect errors in the task; 
furthermore, mind-wandering rates partially mediated the WMC–SART relation, indicating that WMC-related 
differences in goal neglect were due, in part, to variation in the control of conscious thought. 
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Article: 
Why does working memory capacity (WMC), as measured by complex memory-span tasks, predict individual 
differences in fluid cognitive abilities? Attentional theories argue that WMC tasks’ predictive power derives 
largely from their tapping domain-general, executive-control capabilities, which are also widely important to 
complex cognition (e.g., Hasher, Lustig, & Zacks, 2007; Kane, Conway, Hambrick, & Engle, 2007). Some 
supporting evidence comes from correlations between WMC and simple attention tasks that make limited 
memory demands, such as the anti-saccade task. Here, higher WMC subjects better restrain the habitual 
response of orienting toward a visual-onset cue than do lower WMC subjects, allowing them to more 
successfully act according to the task goal of looking in the opposite direction (e.g., Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & 
Engle, 2001; Unsworth, Schrock, & Engle, 2004). 
 
Some of the WMC-related variation in attention-task performance seems attributable to individual differences 
in maintaining sufficient access to the current task goals so that they, rather than habit, control responding (see 
Kane, Conway, et al., 2007). In the Stroop task, for example, which elicits habit–goal conflict (i.e., word 
reading vs. color naming), Kane and Engle (2003) presented subjects with either many incongruent, 
mismatching trials (the word BLUE in red) or many congruent, matching trials (the word RED in red). With 
many incongruent trials, the context reinforced the color-naming goal because most trials presented word–color 
conflict and thus demanded ignoring the words; active goal maintenance was thus aided (or supplanted) by 
environmental support. In contrast, with many congruent trials, goals were not contextually reinforced. Word 
reading allowed correct responses on most trials, so subjects had to actively maintain goal access to respond 
appropriately to the rare incongruent trials. Indeed, WMC-related differences were strongest in high-congruent 
conditions, where goal maintenance was most critical: Lower WMC subjects com-mitted 50–100% more errors 
than did higher WMC subjects on incongruent trials, apparently maintaining less suitable access to goal-
relevant information. 
 
We suggest that lower WMC subjects show frequent goal neglect (Duncan, 1995) because goal maintenance 
fluctuates across trials depending, in part, on the ability to resist interference from task-unrelated thoughts 
(TUTs). Simply put, lower WMC subjects seem less able than higher WMC subjects to sustain attention to the 
demands of the ongoing task. This intuitive view is not universally accepted, however. Oberauer and colleagues 
(e.g., Oberauer, Su¨0, Wilhelm, & Sander, 2007; Wilhelm & Oberauer, 2006) instead attribute such goal-neglect 
failures to insufficient binding of stimulus–response (S-R) mappings. At a broad level, Oberauer et al. claimed 
that WMC variation reflects the ability to establish, maintain, and decouple mental bindings among a limited 
number of activated representations, as in associating auditory stimuli with temporal sequences, visual stimuli 
with locations, or novel responses with imperative stimuli. In tasks such as Stroop and antisaccade, then, lower 
WMC subjects, as compared with higher WMC subjects, may respond slowly or more frequently in error 
because they cannot as effectively bind incompatible S-R map-pings, not because their attention cannot be as 
effectively maintained throughout the task. In fact, Wilhelm and Oberauer (2006) found that both WMC and 
fluid intelligence correlated strongly with performance of choice-response-time tasks presenting arbitrary S-R 
mappings. 
 
Here we tested the binding versus attentional views of WMC variation in goal neglect by probing subjects’ 
thoughts during an executive-control task. If insufficient binding or drift in its efficacy is responsible for goal-
neglect errors, then subjects’ TUT experiences and WMC-related variation in mind wandering should be 
irrelevant. If, however, lapses of goal maintenance that accompany (or result from) slips of thought actually 
contribute to goal-neglect errors and if WMC variation predicts subjects’ goal-maintenance efficacy, then TUT 
intrusion rates should mediate (at least partially) the relation between WMC and goal neglect. Indeed, TUTs 
often predict performance errors (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006) and lower WMC subjects experience more 
mind wandering during effortful daily life activities than do higher WMC subjects (Kane, Brown, et al., 2007). 
Indirect evidence thus supports our claim that individual differences in attention control and mind wandering 
contribute to WMC’s association with goal maintenance and neglect. 
 
Our more direct test here attempted to link goal-neglect errors to subjective experience within a task yielding 
high rates of goal neglect and mind wandering. The sustained attention to response task (SART; Robertson, 
Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997) is a go/no-go task requiring responses to all stimuli except 
infrequent targets. Whereas previous SART research has administered thought probes at least several seconds 
(to half a minute) following critical target events (e.g., Smallwood et al., 2004; Smallwood, McSpadden, & 
Schooler, 2007), we probed thoughts immediately after no-go targets to link in-the-moment subjective 
experience to performance. We predicted that TUT reports would be accompanied by more errors than would 
on-task thought reports and that higher WMC subjects would experience fewer TUTS and commit fewer 
performance errors than would lower-WMC subjects (moreover, to the extent that response time [RT] 
variability may also reflect more subtle slips of thought and goal neglect, we also predicted that WMC and TUT 
rate would predict intra-individual RT variation). Of most importance, we hypothesized that TUT rate would 
partially mediate the relation between WMC and SART performance (accuracy and RT variability), indicating 
that attention control contributes to WMC’s influence on response-conflict tasks. 
 
Of secondary interest, we adapted the SART to contrast the effects of different ongoing processing demands on 
mind wandering, namely conceptual versus perceptual judgments (subjects either responded to words from one 
semantic category and withheld responses to another category or responded to words in one font and withheld 
responses to another font). This manipulation was motivated by research suggesting that TUT frequency 
decreases when people engage in more conceptual versus perceptual processing. For example, subjects report 
fewer TUTs when studying and recalling words according to conceptual versus orthographic dimensions (e.g., 
musical instruments vs. words beginning with P; Smallwood, Baracia, Lowe, & Obonsawin, 2003; Smallwood, 
Obonsawin, & Heim, 2003). Most relevant here, Smallwood, Riby, Heim, and Davies (2006) reported lower 
TUT rates for subjects completing a semantic SART, where subjects responded to words and withheld 
responses to XXXXX strings, versus a perceptual SART that replaced all words with OOOOO strings. This 
finding warrants further examination, however, because the semantic benefit only occurred for subjects 
instructed to memorize the SART words for a subsequent test and not for subjects who encoded the words 
incidentally. We therefore followed up this work by manipulating the SART’s conceptual demands while more 
closely matching other task features. 
Finally, we tested the association between in-the-moment TUT reports and general retrospective reports of 
cognitive failures with the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ; Broadbent, Cooper, FitzGerald, & Parkes, 
1982). The CFQ assesses everyday attention, memory, and motor failures and modestly predicts SART errors 
(Robertson et al., 1997) and TUT rates (Smallwood et al., 2004). We sought to replicate these findings while 
pitting our objective WMC measures against the CFQ in predicting SART performance and TUTs. 
 
Method  
Subjects 
Two hundred forty-four undergraduates (aged 18–35 years) completed WMC and SART sessions during one 
semester. We dropped data from 1 subject who did not follow SART instructions. 
 
WMC Screening 
In 90-min sessions, we tested 3–6 subjects using three automated complex-span tasks: operation span (OSPAN), 
symmetry span (SSPAN), and reading span (RSPAN). The tasks required subjects to maintain access to 
memory items while completing an unrelated processing task with an individualized response deadline (M + 2.5 
SDs), calculated during 15 processing-task-only items (Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005). In OSPAN, 
subjects verified solutions to compound equations. In RSPAN, subjects verified the meaningfulness of 
sentences. In SSPAN, subjects verified the symmetry of black-and-white matrix patterns. In OSPAN and 
RSPAN, a capital letter (randomly selected among 12) appeared for 250 ms, 200 ms after either operation–
reading verification or response deadline. After 3–7 verification-letter pairs, all 12 letters appeared onscreen and 
subjects identified, via mouse click, the presented letters in serial order. In SSPAN, one square of a 4 X 4 grid 
was shaded red for 650 ms, 200 ms after either symmetry verification or response deadline. After 2–5 
verification– grid pairs, subjects recalled the locations of the colored squares in serial order by mouse clicking 
on an empty grid. The tasks presented each set length (3–7 in OSPAN and RSPAN; 2–5 in SSPAN) three times, 
randomly ordered for each subject. 
 
The span score was the sum of items recalled in serial position (Conway et al., 2005). We converted span scores 
to z scores and averaged them into a WMC composite. Scores correlated.65 (RSPAN X OSPAN), .56 (OSPAN 
X SSPAN), and .53 (SSPAN X RSPAN). The WMC composite was normally distributed (skew = -0.64; 
kurtosis = 0.07). 
 
SART 
Design and Materials 
The design was a 3 X 2 mixed-model factorial, with SART type (semantic, perceptual, perceptual–semantic) 
manipulated between subjects and stimulus type (target, nontarget) manipulated within subjects. We defined 
targets as the no-go trials presenting an infrequent stimulus type and requiring restraint of the prepotent ―go‖ 
response. 
 
In semantic SART, nontarget words came from one category (e.g., animals) and no-go targets from another 
(e.g., foods), counterbalanced across subjects. In perceptual SART, nontarget words appeared in lowercase type 
and no-go targets in uppercase. In a third condition, perceptual–semantic, subjects made perceptual decisions 
but targets and nontargets differed on both dimensions (e.g., animals vs. foods). Animal and food names 
(excluding animals commonly eaten) for semantic and perceptual–semantic SARTs came from Battig and 
Montague (1969). We drew words for the perceptual SART quasi-randomly from all Battig–Montague 
categories. Stimuli appeared in black against a white background, in 18-point Courier-New font, via CRT or 
LCD monitors. 
 
Procedure 
We tested subjects individually in sound-attenuated rooms with white noise machines. Subjects completed a 
modified CFQ and then the SART. 
 
CFQ–Memory and Attention Lapses (CFQ-MAL). We modified the CFQ to present only its items about 
memory and attention lapses; we also created new items and drew others from similar questionnaires (Brown & 
Ryan, 2003; Reason & Mycielska, 1982; Sunderland, Harris, & Baddeley, 1983; for the full scale, see 
http://www.uncg.edu/—mjkane/memlab.html). This computerized CFQ-MAL presented 40 questions (with 
responses on a 1–5 scale: 1 = never, 2 = rarely, 3 = once in a while, 4 = often, 5 = very often); subjects 
responded via keypress. Total score reflected the item sum. For our sample (N = 242; data from 1 subject were 
lost), principal-components analysis yielded a first component (eigen-value = 11.5) accounting for 29% of the 
variance; the second (eigenvalue = 2. 1) accounted for only 5.3 %, so we calculated one score for each subject 
(M = 111.5, SD = 19. 1, skewness = 0.64, kurtosis = 0.67). 
 
SART. An experimenter read aloud onscreen instructions. Subjects were to press the space bar as quickly as 
possible for non-targets and withhold responses to targets. Subjects completed 10 practice trials before seeing 
thought-probe instructions, which included a thought-probe screen with the question, ―What were you just 
thinking about?‖ and seven response options. We instructed subjects to report what they were thinking just 
before the probe, and the experimenter elaborated on these choices:  
 
(a) task, that is, thinking about the stimulus words or appropriate response; 
 
(b) task performance, that is, evaluating one’s own performance; 
 
(c) everyday stuff, that is, thinking about recent or impending life events or tasks; 
 
(d)  current state of being, that is, thinking about conditions such as hunger or sleepiness;  
 
(e)  personal worries, that is, thinking about concerns, troubles, or fears;  
 
(f) daydreams, that is, having fantasies disconnected from reality; or  
 
(g) other, that is, other thought types. During the task, thought probes presented the italicized category names; 
subjects then pressed the corresponding number key. 
 
The SART presented 1,810 words: Each was centered for 300 ms and then followed by a 900-ms mask (12 
capitalized Xs, the length of the longest word). The first 10 (unanalyzed) buffer trials presented nontargets. The 
remaining trials comprised eight blocks, each presenting 225 trials consisting of 45 words repeated five times in 
a different random order. Within each set of 45, five targets appeared randomly among 40 nontargets (11 % of 
trials). The same five targets appeared across all blocks. Thought probes followed 60% of the targets within 
each block. After the first four blocks, subjects took a 30-s break. Because there were only five target events per 
block, our analyses collapsed the eight task blocks into four task-quarter blocks. 
 
Results 
We report nondirectional null-hypothesis significance tests with an alpha of .05 and partial eta-squared (ηp
2
) as 
an effect-size estimate. 
 
SART Performance 
Accuracy 
Mean accuracy rates for target (no-go) and nontarget (go) trials were .49 and .95, respectively. For each subject, 
we calculated signal-detection sensitivity (dL) and bias (CL) scores, using formulas for logistic distributions 
(Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988) and adjusting individual hit or false-alarm rates of 0 and 1 by .01. Negative CL 
scores reflect a ―go‖ bias. Figures 1A and 1B present dL and CL scores by task and block. 
 
A 3 (SART type) X 4 (block) mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA) on dL confirmed a main effect of 
only block, F(3, 720) = 35.52, ηp
2
= .13, modified by an interaction, F(6, 720) = 3.64, ηp
2
 = .03, indicating a 
more shallow sensitivity decrease for the semantic than the perceptual SARTs. Repeated-measures ANOVAs 
for each SART, however, indicated significant block  effects: semantic, F(3, 249) = 4.76, ηp
2
= .05; perceptual– 
semantic, F(3, 231) = 15.79, ηp
2
= .17; and perceptual, F(3,240) = 25.32, ηp
2
= .24. A 3 (SART type) X 4 (block) 
mixed-model ANOVA on CL indicated only a block effect, F(3, 720) = 6.135, ηp
2
= .03, and no interaction, F(6, 
720) = 1.22, p = .30, corresponding to a slight decrease in go bias over blocks.  
 
Figure 1. Signal-detection indices from the semantic, perceptual–semantic, and perceptual SARTs (sustained 
attention to response tasks), across task blocks (N = 243). A: Mean sensitivity (dL) estimates. B: Mean bias 
(CL) estimates. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
RT 
Figures 2A and 2B present two nontarget (go-trial) RT indices: means of individual subjects’ means, reflecting 
central tendency, and means of individual subjects’ standard deviations, reflecting intraindividual variability. 
We were particularly interested in RT variability because it may reflect slight attentional fluctuations over the 
course of the task and thus might be sensitive to WMC and TUT-rate variation. 
 
Semantic-based responses were slower than perceptually based responses, with stable RTs over blocks: A 3 
(SART type) X 4 (block) mixed ANOVA on mean RT indicated only a main effect of SART type, F(2, 240) = 
21.98, ηp
2
= .15, and no interaction, F(6, 720) = 1.17, p = .32. In contrast, RT variability increased over blocks, 
but similarly across tasks: A 3 (SART type) X 4 (block) mixed ANOVA confirmed only a block effect, F(3, 
720) = 74.28, ηp
2
= .24, and an interaction that approached conventional significance, F(6, 720) = 1.94, p = .07. 
Subjects thus became more variable with time on task on all SART types. 
 
Figure 2. Response time (RT) measures from the semantic, perceptual–semantic, and perceptual SARTs 
(sustained attention to response tasks), across task blocks (N = 243). A: Means of individual subjects’ mean 
RTs. B: Means of individual subjects’ RT standard deviations. Error bars represent standard errors. 
subjects’ performance, sometimes labeled task-related interference (e.g., Smallwood et al., 2006), composed 
24% of responses. As task-related interference represents an ambiguous intermediary between on- and off-
task thought, we do not analyze it further. 
In previous SART studies, RTs were shorter preceding target errors than preceding accurate responses, which 
some investigators have interpreted as habitual, mindless responding (Robertson et al., 1997; Smallwood et al., 
2004). Here, too, RTs for the four non-target trials preceding target errors were significantly faster (M = 382 
ms) than those preceding correct responses (M = 455 ms), t(242) = —25.22. 
 
Thought Reports 
Subjects reported task-related and task-unrelated thoughts on 21% and 55% of thought probes, respectively; 
TUTs were defined as reports of current state (28.4%), daydreams (8.6%), everyday stuff (8.2%), worries 
(4.7%), and other (5.5%). Thoughts about 
 
Figure 3 illustrates that TUTs increased and on-task thoughts decreased over blocks. For TUTs, a 3 (SART 
type) X 4 (block) mixed ANOVA indicated a main effect of only block, F(3, 720) = 223.45, ηp
2
= .48, and no 
interaction, F(3, 720) < 1. For on-task thoughts, a parallel ANOVA indicated, again, only a block effect, 
F(3,720) =44.20, ηp
2
= .16, and no interaction, F(3, 720) = 1.49, p = .18. Because thought reports did not vary by 
SART type, subsequent analyses collapse over this variable. 
 
We expected RTs to trials preceding a TUT to be shorter than those preceding an on-task thought, indicating 
attentional lapses and nonreflective responding. Indeed, responses to the four non-target trials preceding TUTs 
were significantly faster (M = 415 ms) than those preceding on-task thoughts (M = 426 ms), t(235) = -2.73. 
 
Figure 3. Mean proportion of thought reports by thought category across task blocks (N = 243). Error bars 
represent standard errors. TUT = task-unrelated thought; on-task = on-task thought, SART = sustained 
attention to response task. 
 
Performance by Thought Report 
No-go accuracy was lower for targets during TUTs (M = .42) than during on-task thoughts (M = .66), t(23 1) =  
-13.83; a 2 (thought report) X 4 (block) repeated-measures ANOVA indicated that this effect’s magnitude 
persisted across blocks, F(3, 390) = 1.535, p = .21. At the level of intratask individual differences, subjects’ 
overall TUT rate predicted dL (r = -.37) and nontarget RT standard deviation (r = .40) but not CL (r = . 11). 
Moreover, TUT–dL correlations increased significantly from Block 1 to Block 2 to Block 3 (rs = -.17, -.28, -.39, 
and -.39 for Blocks 1–4, respectively), as indicated by Williams’s t test (Steiger, 1980). Correlations between 
TUT rate and nontarget RT standard deviations increased significantly from Blocks 1 to 2 only (rs = .19, .35, 
.37, and .43 for Blocks 1–4, respectively). SART performance thus became more linked to mind wandering as 
the task progressed. 
 
Intertask Individual Differences 
Table 1 presents correlations among all the task variables, along with their reliability estimates. WMC and 
CFQ-MAL were uncorrelated, and neither score differed among SART groups (Fs < 1). As expected, WMC 
variation predicted SART performance and thought, correlating significantly with dL, RT variability, and TUT 
rate but not with CL. CFQ-MAL scores showed significant but apparently weaker correlations with SART 
variables. 
 
Table 2 presents hierarchical-regression analyses predicting SART dL with WMC, CFQ-MAL, and TUT rate. 
Considering first WMC and TUTs, each accounted for shared and unique dL variance: WMC accounted for 
8.2%, with about half shared by TUT rate. TUTs predicted 9.8% of the variance independent of WMC (total R
2
 
= .180). Moreover, WMC, TUT rate, and CFQ-MAL all predicted unique dL variance, but the three together 
accounted for little more variance than did WMC and TUT rate alone (total R
2
 = .198). Table 3 presents parallel 
regressions for intrasubject RT variability, where WMC accounted for about 12.3% of the variance, with almost 
half shared with TUT rate; TUT rate accounted for 10.7% of the variance beyond WMC (total R
2
 = .230). Here, 
WMC and TUT rate again predicted unique variance beyond CFQ-MAL scores, but CFQ-MAL predicted RT 
variability only beyond WMC, not TUT rate (total R
2
 = .240). 
 
Discussion 
Subjects who differed in WMC, as measured by complex-span tasks, also varied in SART performance and 
subjective experience. 
 
Note: N = 243. Values on the diagonal reflect Cronbach’s alpha for each measure as a reliability estimate; 
alphas were calculated over task blocks for sustained attention to response task (SART) measures and over 
items for the CFQ-MAL. WMC = working memory capacity; TUT = proportion self-reported task-unrelated 
thoughts; dL = signal-detection sensitivity measure on SART; RT variation = intra-individual standard 
deviation for nontarget reaction times on SART; CFQ-MAL = Cognitive Failures Questionnaire– Memory 
and Attention Lapses. N = 242 for CFQ-MAL analyses. 
. p < .05. ** p < .0 1. 
 
Thus, WMC predicted not only attention-task errors and RT variability (see also Kane et al., 2001; Kane & 
Engle, 2003) but also mind-wandering rates (see also Kane, Brown, et al., 2007); indeed, our objective WMC 
measure better predicted subjective TUT experiences than did the CFQ-MAL, a subjective self-report measure 
of everyday attentional failures (ruling out demand characteristics in our WMC effects and attesting to the 
validity of probed thought reports). Of most importance, however, individual differences in TUT rate accounted 
for half of WMC’s shared variance with SART performance, suggesting that much of WMC’s predictive power 
is attributable to its reflecting people’s ability to simply keep their thoughts focused on the task at hand, a notion 
consistent with our executive-attention view. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WMC and Executive Attention 
Our individual-differences findings confirm key hypotheses from the executive-attention theory of WMC (e.g., 
Kane, Conway, et al., 2007), which holds that WMC’s predictive power derives primarily from its tapping 
attention-control mechanisms that, among other functions, keep novel goals readily maintained to regulate 
ongoing behavior amid conflict. If goal-neglect errors arise through attention-control failures, and if many 
attention-control failures are complete enough to result in TUT experiences, then WMC-related variation in 
TUT rate should partially mediate WMC-related variation in performance. It did, and these findings seem 
inconsistent with a binding explanation of WMC-related variation in goal neglect (e.g., Wilhelm & Oberauer, 
2006). If lower WMC subjects more often fail to act according to goals because they less effectively bind 
response productions to stimulus classes (e.g., ―press key for animals‖), then performance differences between 
lower and higher WMC subjects need not have anything to do with mind wandering, nor should WMC even 
predict TUT rates during cognitive tasks. 
 
Important questions remain, however, regarding the SART variance explained by WMC independent of TUT 
rate. Kane and Engle (2003) concluded that (a) WMC predicts attention-task performance via goal-maintenance 
and competition-resolution mechanisms, the latter of which only engages subsequent to the former (e.g., in 
Stroop, resolving conflict between color and word dimensions only proceeds if the color-naming goal is 
accessible), and (b) higher WMC subjects are superior to lower WMC subjects in both processes. In the SART, 
subjects must not only keep the no-go goal in mind throughout long sequences of go trials but also successfully 
inhibit this prepotent response when required. Indeed, go-trial RTs preceding errors were 73 ms faster here than 
those preceding correct responses, whereas RTs preceding TUT reports were only 11 ms faster than those 
preceding on-task thoughts. Fast, erroneous responding clearly occurs even when subjects are reportedly task 
focused, presumably reflecting within- and between-subject variation in competition resolution. 
 
We therefore suggest that WMC’s TUT-independent prediction of SART performance is largely due to its 
relation to competition resolution. If so, two predictions follow: (a) A SART that induces weaker prepotencies 
to overcome should correlate less strongly with WMC (due to a minimization of competition-resolution 
variance) and (b) SART variance that is predicted by WMC should be more fully mediated by TUT rate, as 
subjects must maintain goal activation that is not externally reinforced. We are currently testing these 
predictions with SARTs that present mostly no-go trials—requiring no overt responses—so the ―go‖ goal 
requires active maintenance but accurate responding requires little competition resolution. We believe that this 
experiment also tests further the binding theory (Oberauer et al., 2007). If WMC’s non-TUT prediction of 
SART performance derives from S-R binding effectiveness instead of reflecting competition-resolution 
processes (Wilhelm & Oberauer, 2006), then a SART with weak prepotencies should still correlate substantially 
with WMC, because subjects must still bind no-go and go responses to stimulus categories. Moreover, SART 
variance predicted by WMC should not be mediated by TUT rate. 
 
Theoretical and Methodological Issues in Mind Wandering 
Our results not only inform WMC theory, but they also raise concerns about current theoretical and 
methodological approaches to mind wandering. Of most importance, a major theory of mind wandering seems 
to predict the reverse of our central WMC finding. Smallwood and Schooler (2006) argued that mind wandering 
draws heavily on WMC and executive resources, largely on the basis of findings that TUTs decrease during 
demanding tasks and that performance errors increase during TUTs. By this view, as primary tasks consume 
more resources, fewer remain to support mind wandering and vice versa. Moreover, subjects who have more 
resources available (e.g., higher WMC) should be able to mind wander more during ongoing tasks than should 
subjects with fewer resources (e.g., lower WMC). 
 
Of course, we found the opposite: Lower WMC subjects mind wandered more during a demanding primary task 
than did higher WMC subjects (see also Kane, Brown, et al., 2007). We therefore suggest that TUTs represent 
an executive-control failure to maintain on-task thoughts and that the generation and persistence of TUTs do not 
require executive resources. Rather, TUTs are automatically and continually generated as part of the thought 
stream (e.g., Bar, 2007; James, 1890) in response to internal and external cues (e.g., Klinger, 197 1), and 
executive-control processes keep these thoughts out of the focus of attention during resource-demanding tasks. 
Neuroscience research connecting TUTs to a default-mode network of the brain (e.g., Mason et al., 2007) 
suggests that mind wandering may be a return of attention to the type of thoughts produced while subjects are at 
rest. By this provisional view (which requires further refinement and test), TUTs either cause performance 
errors by displacing stimulus and goal representations from attentional focus or correlate with errors as a signal 
(or side effect) of failed attention control. Difficult tasks minimize TUTs because to meet task demands, they 
stimulate engagement of control processes, one function of which is to sustain conscious focus and actively 
prevent TUTs from occurring. 
 
Regarding a secondary motivation for the present study, we failed to replicate prior findings that mind 
wandering varies with the conceptual-processing demands of ongoing tasks: TUT rates were equivalent for 
semantic and perceptual SARTs, rather than being reduced in the semantic task. It may be important that most 
experiments showing reduced TUTs during conceptual processing have involved intentional memory encoding, 
retrieval, or both (e.g., Small-wood, Baracia, et al., 2003). Such task requirements may encourage integration or 
associations across conceptually related items and thus provide a scaffold for maintaining on-task thought. The 
SART, in contrast, neither requires nor promotes such mental organization, as individual stimuli require 
independent judgments. Indeed, Smallwood et al. (2006) observed a reduced TUT rate for the semantic versus 
nonsemantic SARTs only for subjects instructed to commit the stimuli to memory, who therefore may have 
thought more elaboratively and cohesively about the stimuli. 
 
Although our findings generally support the notion that variation in conscious thoughts predict (if not cause) 
some variation in task performance, they also indicate that mind wandering and performance errors are not 
interchangeable indices of attentional lapses, as some researchers have suggested (e.g., Smallwood, 
McSpadden, Luus, & Schooler, 2008; Smallwood et al., 2007). Responses to targets were appropriately 
withheld 42% of the time that subjects’ thoughts were off task and inappropriately committed 34% of the time 
that subjects’ thoughts were on task. Moreover, as noted previously, RTs preceding errors were much faster 
than those preceding accurate responses, but RTs preceding TUTs were only slightly faster than those preceding 
on-task reports. Thus, there is more to executive-task performance than just goal neglect and mind wandering, 
and habit-based errors need not reflect only lapses of sustained attention (Kane & Engle, 2003; Logan & 
Cowan, 1984). 
 
Conclusion 
Our findings demonstrate the utility of subjective mind-wandering reports to the experimental and differential 
study of executive functions (see also Kane, Brown, et al., 2007; Small-wood & Schooler, 2006). Goal-neglect 
errors and some WMC-related differences in attention-task performance appear to stem in part from momentary 
failures of conscious thought control. As in the present experiment, further assessment of subjective experience 
during cognitive tasks (and especially off-task thoughts) should provide evidence for or against particular 
mechanistic views of executive control and its variation. 
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